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BOOK REVIEWS

FAILURES AND SUCCESSES
Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post–Cold War Era, by Michael Mandelbaum. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 485 pages. $29.95.

“You Americans are so naive” is one
of the opening quotes that Michael
Mandelbaum uses to introduce Mission
Failure (p. vi). The quotation does
not come, as one might expect, from
a foreign world leader, but from Steve
Martin on Saturday Night Live. Thus,
one sees from the first Mandelbaum’s
objective: to narrate and explain U.S.
foreign policy from 1991 to 2014
in a way that can be understood by
interested general readers who might
recognize Martin more than they would
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (the
source of another opening quotation).
In the backdrop of this narrative is the
theme of the failure of humanitarian
interventionism—the inclination to
intervene in world affairs to promote
values rather than for direct selfinterests—to achieve meaningful results.
Mandelbaum describes his intent for the
book rather accurately: “Together the
chapters tell the story of good, sometimes noble, and thoroughly American
intentions coming up against the deeply
embedded, often harsh, and profoundly
un-American realities of places far from
the United States. In this encounter

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 146

the realities prevailed” (p. 13). In his
perspective, post–Cold War American
decision makers viewed the world
through a distorted lens that only their
country’s enormous relative power made
possible. This distorted view caused
them to believe that democratic values
and human rights could be exported
by interventions using armed force.
Mandelbaum describes this as “missionary work” transferred from the religious
to the political sphere, and links it to the
same impulse that established the Peace
Corps. He then begins a general historical narrative of American relations with
Russia and China, humanitarian
interventions from Somalia to Kosovo,
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
the Arab-Israeli conflict, all during the
1991–2014 period. In his final chapter,
entitled “Restoration,” he argues that
the rise of Chinese economic power
and the reemergence of Russia have
put an end to the post–Cold War
world; the United States no longer
has the power to attempt to make
changes in other political cultures.
To illustrate the enormous relative power
that America held at the beginning
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of this period, Mandelbaum starts his
introduction with the surrender of the
Iraqi army to General Norman Schwarz
kopf and the other coalition military
leaders on March 3, 1991. The author
maintains that, up to then, America’s
latent desire to educate the world on the
benefits of democracy and human rights
had been held in check only by the existence of powerful rivals—specifically,
one powerful rival: the Soviet Union.
Suddenly, with that entity collapsed,
China apparently quiescent, and the U.S.
armed forces having demonstrated their
absolute military dominance on (what
was considered) the modern battlefield,
American political and social leaders
could indulge themselves in doing what
they perceived to be in the interest of
the collective global good. The United
States “chose to spend some of its vast
reserves of power on the geopolitical
equivalent of luxury items: the remaking
of other countries” (p. 7). The difference from previous eras was that now
the United States became involved in
crises in which it had no direct national
interest—crises that, no matter their
result, would have little if any impact on
American freedom or prosperity. The
outcome, according to Mandelbaum,
has been “mission failure,” given that
much of the world has different cultural
values concerning the “good” and that
the results have been temporary or they
have let loose more destructive forces.
Mandelbaum postulates that the crossover point at which the aim of American
foreign policy changed from achieving
national interests to performing
“missionary work” occurred between the
administrations of George H. W. Bush
and Bill Clinton. He sees the subsequent
actions of Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barack Obama as a foreign policy of
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continuing humanitarian intervention
(albeit with differing degrees of overt
force), with a shared goal of relieving human suffering and exporting democracy.
Mandelbaum identifies the expansion
of NATO—an action that President
George H. W. Bush promised the
Russians would not occur—as the most
catastrophic of mistakes. Against the
advice of concerned experts, President
Clinton promoted NATO expansion,
believing that it would solidify democratic governance throughout Europe
without alienating a Russia assumed
to have adopted democratic capitalism
permanently. The decision “squandered
. . . much of the windfall that had come
to the United States as the result of the
way the Cold War had ended. . . . It did
this in return for no gain at all, making
NATO expansion one of the greatest
blunders in the history of American
foreign policy” (p. 69). The author identifies other mistaken actions (such as the
Iraq War) and skewers some inept policy
makers along the way (Secretaries of
State Warren Christopher and Madeleine
Albright are particular targets), but the
alienation of Russia—which facilitated
that country’s return to internal
authoritarianism—was the factor that
ultimately ended hopes for a “new world
order.”
Mandelbaum, professor of American
foreign policy at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins, maintains
a solid and comfortable—if relatively
uninspiring—writing style, making his
argument in measured terms. As in his
other recent books, he aims at a broad
audience. He gives no indications, however, that his previous work—such as his
collaboration with journalist Thomas
L. Friedman, the most successful
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troubadour of globalization—argued for
a spirit of liberal internationalism that
leads logically to efforts at humanitarian
intervention. To Mandelbaum, the
apparent difference between liberal
internationalism and the humanitarianinterventionist approach that some U.S.
presidents have chosen is that the United
States decided to use its resources to rescue people (metaphorically) rather than
to concentrate on defending the global
system of economic liberalism. However,
how one “defends a system” without
intervening in particular crises within
that system remains rather unclear.
Liberal internationalism supposedly is
an antidote to great-power politics, but
ultimately Mandelbaum concludes that
America’s failure at preserving its beneficial role in the international system (and
its interests) was the result of not paying
most of its attention to, and sometimes
accommodating, the reemerging
great powers. The “malign effects” of
an angry Russia and a contemptuous
China, Mandelbaum writes on his final
page, “will be felt long after the failed
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and even Afghanistan and Iraq
ha[ve] faded from memory” (p. 381).
SAM J. TANGREDI

The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships
in Counter-Insurgency, by Walter C. Ladwig III.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017. 360
pages. $34.99 (paperback).

The advent of a new U.S. presidential
administration has resulted in a series
of new defense guidance and strategy
documents—ranging from the National
Security Strategy to the National Defense
Strategy and the Nuclear Posture
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Review—all of which have placed a
clear emphasis on the risks posed
by the recrudescence of great-power
rivalry. The National Defense Strategy,
in particular, garnered praise from the
national security commentariat for
its terse declaration that great-power
competition, rather than terrorism,
now constituted “the primary focus of
U.S. national security.” Indeed, for an
American public increasingly weary of
costly and protracted counterinsurgency
(COIN) campaigns in the Middle East,
there was something inherently appealing about this apparent reordering
of American defense priorities.
Unfortunately, however, events over the
past year have demonstrated repeatedly
that this much-touted focal rearrangement is not something that simply can
be wished into existence. Indeed, despite
running on a platform promising greater
disengagement from the Middle East,
President Trump has found himself
compelled to deploy ever more soldiers
to Afghanistan and the Levant. Meanwhile, cabinet officials have suggested
that Washington may need to maintain
an open-ended military presence in
Syria, partly as a means of countering
growing Iranian influence. Last but not
least, the deadly ambush of a unit of U.S.
special operations forces (SOFs) in the
deserts of Niger revealed to many baffled
American citizens the full extent of their
nation’s global counterterrorism footprint: eight thousand SOFs active on any
given day in more than eighty countries.
All this underscores the need for
U.S. security managers to continue to plan for and debate extended
counterterrorism and stabilization
campaigns—however much they
may pine privately for a post-COIN
era. It also renders Ladwig’s recent
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